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Abstract
Since the 1990ies the higher education system in the German speak-
ing area has been faced an essential paradigm change: The model of
governmental steering and control was replaced by the model of govern-
mental supervision following the concept of New Public Management.
It was assumed that an enlargement of autonomy would increase the
efficiency of the whole tertiary system. At the same time, the restruc-
turing of the European higher education system has been started in
1999 by implementing the Bologna reforms. To investigate how the
Swiss universities have digested the national and international reforms
we apply an input distance function and estimate the technical effi-
ciency of a panel data set containing all of the 12 Swiss universities for
the period of 1999-2008 both at university level and discipline level.
We find essential efficiency variations across the disciplines caused by
structural differences regarding the endowment with ressources and
output targets which indicate the need to analyse efficiency at a disag-
gregated level. Furthermore, our results show that there are external
determinants that affect the efficiency of Swiss universities.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990ies the higher education system in the German speaking area
has been faced an essential paradigm change: The model of governmental
steering and control was replaced by the model of governmental supervision
following the concept of New Public Management (see e.g. Schenker-Wicki,
2004). Hence, the Swiss Universities were granted more autonomy by the
responsible parliaments along with the introduction of global budgeting,
performance agreements, and altered reporting. The politicians and the
governmental authorities were persuaded that the enlargement of autonomy
would increase the efficiency of the whole tertiary system. In this context the
term dividend of autonomy was introduced as it was assumed that a higher
degree of freedom in terms of financing and organizational structuring would
allow to manage internal processes more efficiently.
Beside these national reforms the restructuring of the European higher
education system has been started in 1999 when signing the Bologna Decla-
ration by 29 European ministries of education. The aim was to establish a
common European higher education area by 2010, and to promote the com-
petiveness of higher education in the European countries in order to enhance
the economic power and employment in Europe. The European ministries of
education met all two years in order to discuss the framework of the Bologna
reforms and the process made with respect to developing a system of easily
readable and comparable degrees, adopting a system based on three cycles,
i.e. at Bachelor, Master’s and Doctoral level, enhancing the student and
academic mobility and improving the quality to secure high standards of
the higher education in Europe.1 Indeed, Switzerland is one of the countries
in Europe which has implemented the Bologna reforms rapidly.2 Recent
extrapolations show that more than 95% of the students will be enrolled in
the new Bachelor and Master’s degrees until 2010-2011 (Stocktaking, 2007).
After all, to investigate how the Swiss universities have digested the
national and international reforms we employ a data envelopment analysis
(DEA) and estimate the technical efficiency3 of all 12 Swiss universities for
1For more details see the Bologna Declaration (1999) and the Communique´s of Prague
(2001) and Berlin (2003).
2Bologna guidelines were issued for universities by the Swiss University Conference
(SUK) in 2003 and those for universities of applied sciences and teacher education, re-
spectively, by the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education (EDK in 2002 and
2005.
3The efficiency measurement goes back to Koopmans (1951), Debreu (1951), and Farrell
(1957) who introduced the concept of technical efficiency; whereas technical efficiency is
defined as a firm’s ability to produce a given output with a minimum of its inputs or to
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the period of 1999-2008. Contrary to other studies, we apply the efficiency
analysis at a disaggregated level to account explicitly for heterogenous higher
education production. In this regard, the data set includes detailed infor-
mation on input and output measures such as expenditures, academic and
non-academic personnel, enrolled students, doctoral students and research
funds differentiated for four disciplines: humanities and social sciences, nat-
ural sciences, technical sciences and finally medicine. Furthermore, we are
interested in getting information of possible drivers which may have an im-
pact on the efficiency of higher education production. Applying a two-stage
approach the DEA efficiency scores obtained in the first stage are then used
as dependent variable in a truncated regression in a second stage. This will
be done in order to get some evidence on steering instruments which could
be considered to make higher education production more efficient by both
the university management and the governmental authorities.
Section 2 discusses theoretical aspects of the production of higher edu-
cation and summarizes previous research on the performance of universities.
The estimation approach along with the model specifications and methodol-
ogy are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 provides information on the data
set and the modelling approach used for our analyses. Estimation results of
the efficiency analyses and the regressions are presented in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Background and Previous Research
Public authorities that decide on the allocation of financial resources are
reliant on information such as performance measures to secure effective and
efficient employment of financial resources. The relationship between a pub-
lic authority (principal) and university personnel (agent) can be modeled
in a principal-agent framework assuming information assymmetry due to
the divergence of interests (see e.g. Kivisto¨, 2005). With respect to that
the problem of moral hazard it is a known phenomenon and can become a
problem for a government principal. The pursue of private interest by the
agent can be transfered to higher education institutions if they actively pro-
mote their own objectives at the expense of public funds. To overcome the
problem of moral hazard the principal can either try to discover the agent’s
behaviour by investing in monitoring procedures (behaviour-based contract)
or it can contract on the outcomes of the agent’s behaviour (outcome-based
contract) - following the concepts of New Public Managment.
maximize its output given a fix level of inputs.
2
In this respect, the significance of applying analyses based on bench-
marks and efficiency measurements in the higher education sector has be-
come more important in recent years which can be seen by an increasingly
number of efficiency studies focusing on the tertiary eduction sector. As
those techniques allow the performance comparison of several decision mak-
ing units against a benchmark efficiency analyses provide university manage-
ment as well as policy makers valuable information on efficient production.
In paritular, this might be even more relevant with respect to tight public
budgets.
An interesting result of prior studies which supports the term dividend of
autonomy, stated right in the beginning of the paper, is that the assumption
appears to be confirmed that restrictive regulations and productivity are
negatively related. Universities are more efficient, the more autonomy is
guaranteed by authorities (see e.g. Aghion et al., 2008; Kempkes and Pohl,
2008; Duh and Kuo, 2006).
After all, the higher education sector is characterized by attributes which
make it difficult to measure efficiency directly: First of all, higher education
is determined by its non-profit nature. Second, there is a lack of price
information of many of its inputs and outputs. And third, higher education
institutions use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs.
Moreover, higher education institutions are heterogenous and differ
markedly across several disciplines. Assuming that such attributes affect
the production function an analysis at the university level would yield to bi-
ased efficiency scores. This bias becomes significant in any case the decision
making units (DMUs) differ in terms of resource composition and major out-
put targets. For instance, one would suggest that teaching and research is
binding more financial and human resources in disciplines such as engineer-
ing or medicine (see technical equipment, laboratories, small groups, high
student-faculty ratio) than humanities or law. Additionally, it is assum-
able that acquired third-party funds vary significantly across the disciplines
given that some of them, e.g. engineering or economics, are more inclined
to receive third party funds than others, e.g. humanities. The same is
true for the publication output. Hence, if not accounting for heterogeneous
production one will obtain inappropriate performance measures for higher
education institutions.
Studies which explicitely account for heterogeneity of higher education
production analyse efficiency at the discipline level across a sample of uni-
versities, as Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) and Agasisti and Salerno (2007) applied
for Italy and Filippini and Lepori (2007) for Switzerland by including hu-
manities, natural as well as technical sciences and medicine. Further studies
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account for discipiline specific production by a rough differentiation between
rather science related (engeeniering, medicine) than arts related disciplines
(humanities). Coelli et. al, McMillan and Chan (2006) as well as Stevens
(2005) proceeded in that manner for universities in Australia, Canada and
the United Kingdom. Moreover, other studies focus on particular chosen
academic departments: Madden et al. (1997) estimate efficiency for depart-
ments of economics in Australia and Beasly for departments of chemistry
and physics in the United Kingdom; for Germany, Warning (2004), Fandel
(2003) and Backes-Gellner and Zanders (1989) studied efficiency of specific
departments and subject groups of and across German universities. After
all, the findings show the significance to measure efficiency at a disaggre-
gated level and not at the university level as a whole since the production
technology for different disciplines vary a lot and would – if not doing so –
provide biased results.
3 Estimation Approach and Methodology
In order to analyze the performance of Swiss universities, we use an input
distance function approach. As we consider a higher education institution, a
department or any other decision making unit as a production unit that de-
cides about the use of several inputs such as financial and human resources
as well as physical infrastructure to produce at least two outputs, that is
teaching and research, under specific optimization conditions the distance
function approach proposed by (Shephard, 1953, 1970) seems appropriate.
In contrast to other representations, it allows us to describe a multi-input,
multi-output production technology without any underlying assumptions
on specific behavioral objectives (e.g. cost minimization or profit maximiza-
tion).
To identify inefficiencies either on the input side or on the output side
the distance function approach can be employed assuming input orientation
or output orientation. While an input orientation supposes the minimiza-
tion of inputs given an output determined by exogenous factors an output
orientation supposes the maximazitation of outputs holding inputs fixed.
For higher education institutions, both perspectives can be appropriate.
An output orientation might appear reasonable if inputs of public higher
eduation institutions are decided upon by governmental authorities. Then,
universities are modeled as output maximizing institutions. A rather policy-
driven argument may also support the output-orientated approach. Against
the background of aging societies in the industrialized countries the labour
4
market demand is still immanent for young, highly qualified people. Hence,
a public interest that focus on an increase of the number of university grad-
uates could be present more than ever.
Instead, a major aspect in favour of an input orientation is that an out-
put maximising approach may probably lead to inappropriate incentives on
the behaviour of universities. One may argue that generally an increase
in the number of students and graduates, respectively, might result in a
quality decrease of higher education, and hence might decline university’s
reputation.4 Another reason which promotes an input-orientated approach
is the fact that due to tight governmental budgets the public interest of ac-
countability has also intensified significantly in countries where the tertiary
education system is basically funded by public funding.
Therefore, we model the production process by using the input-orientated
distance function approach in order to focus on avoidable production ineffi-
ciencies at the input side. We are interested in investigating how much the
input vector can be proportionally reduced holding the output vector fixed.
Following Coelli et al. (2005), the input distance function can be defined as:
DI(x, y) = max {ϕ : (x/ϕ) ∈ L(y)} (1)
where L (y) represents the set of all non-negative input vectors
x = (x1, ..., xK) ∈ RK+ which can produce the non-negative output vec-
tor y = (y1, ..., yM ) ∈ RM+ . The proportional reduction of the input vector x
is measured by ϕ. ϕ indicates the distance between an observation located
at the frontier and an observation located above the frontier. The function is
non-decreasing, linearly homogeneous and concave in x, and non-increasing
in y.
In order to estimate the technical efficiency of Swiss universities follow-
ing the distance functions approach we use the data envelopment analysis
(DEA), a method introduced by Charnes et al. (1978). While DEA is a
non-parametric method no assumptions are required with respect to the
functional relationship of inputs and outputs, i.g. based on a linear pro-
gramming approach DEA envelopes the observed data as tightly as possible
without requiring any functional assumptions on the production process. In-
stead, it uses the input and output data themselves to compute a piece-wise
linear production frontier that is formed by the best practice DMU. Then,
4This argument may not be eligible for Switzerland due to the fact that there is a very
efficient system of internal and external quality assurance implemented by every single
university and supervised by the Center of Accrediation and Quality Assurance of the
Swiss Universities. For more details see http://www.oaq.ch/pub/en/01_00_00_home.php
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the efficiency is estimated according to the relative position and distance,
respectively, to the production frontier.
Since the DEA provides only point estimators calculated within a fi-
nite sample, the efficiency scores obtained are highly sensitive to sampling
variations, errors and other noise in the data, and lack common statistical
properties. As a result all deviations from the identified production frontier
can then be interpreted as inefficient production. In order to overcome this
shortcoming, we apply a bootstrap procedure, introduced by Efron (1979).
It is used when the original sampling distribution of the estimator of inter-
est, e.g. the efficiency measures, is unknown. In order to correct for biases
evoked by the sampling size we compute a bootstrap procedure further de-
veloped by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a,b) for non-parametric estimation
techniques with B=2000 replications.5
The production frontier can be estimated either under constant returns
to scale (CRS) or under variable returns to scale (VRS). The CRS approach
suggests that all firms can alter their size, and consequently firms of sub-
optimal size are identified as inefficient (see e.g. Charnes et al., 1978). In
contrast, the VRS approach compares firms of similar size while considering
efficiency variation basically due to the scale differences (see e.g. Fa¨re et al.,
1983; Banker et al., 1984). The latter approach on the one hand is often
used when the firm size cannot be influenced directly by the management
which we assume to be true for universities. Further, it allows us to account
for a possible impact of scale efficiency on the obtained efficiency scores.
Due to that, we apply a production frontier with variable returns to scale.
Then, the technical efficiency is estimated separately for each discipline
across the universities in our sample. Assuming that the universities use
K inputs and M outputs the VRS input-oriented frontier is calculated by
solving the following linear optimization program for each of N observations:
minθ,λθ,
s.t. −yi + Y λ ≥ 0,
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0,
N1′λ = 1,
λ ≥ 0,
(2)
where θ is a scalar and represents the efficiency score for the i-th university.
According to the technical efficiency concept by Farrell (1957)6 it satisfies
5For more details on the bootstrap procedure see Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a,b).
6The Farrell measures are obtained by taking the reciprocal of the efficiency values by
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the condition of θ ≤ 1, with a value of one indicating a point located on the
production frontier, and hence identified as fully efficient, whereas values
between zero and one belongs to inefficient observations using an input vec-
tor above the frontier. λ is a Nx1 vector of constants, X is the KxN matrix
of inputs and Y the MxN matrix of outputs. The i-th university´s input
and output vectors are described by xi and and yi, respectively. Finally, the
convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 ensures that an inefficient university is only
benchmarked against universities of similar size.
Since we are interested in identifying crucial determinants that may af-
fect the efficiency of higher education institutitons we use a two-step pro-
cedure: In the first stage we estimate the efficiency scores at the university
level and for each of the four disciplines across the Swiss universities while
solving the DEA linear programming algorithm. Then, in the second stage
we regress the efficiency scores obtained from the first stage on explanatory
variables using a truncated regression7 that can basically be specified as
follows:
θi = α+ βZi + i, j = 1, ..., n (3)
with α as the constant term,  as the error term and Zi is a (row) vector
of observation-specific explanatory variables for DMU i that we expect is
related to the DMU’s efficiency score, θi, through the vector of parameters
β (common for all i) that we need to estimate.
4 Data and Modelling Approach
The data set comprises detailed information on the total of all 12 Swiss
universities (ten universities are cantonal ones and two are Swiss federal
universities, that are the ETH Zurich and the EPFL Lausanne), throughout
the period of 1999 and 2008. These differences in the legal and financial
framework have to be considered as possible explanations for efficiency dif-
ferences between institutions.8 The data used in this study stem from higher
education statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office in Switzerland.
All input and output variables are discipline specific. They are summarized
the Shepard distance function.
7We apply a truncated regression model in favour of a tobit regression model - therewith
we follow Simar and Wilson 2007 - due to the fact that the efficiency scores obtained from
the first stage with a value equal to one do in fact have this efficiency level and are not
censored. Instead, the efficiency sores are truncated by one.
8We exclude the universities of applied sciences, since they differ considerably in the
structure of the curricula as well as in their activities, e.g. research share.
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in Table 1. Due to the rather small sample - if using the observations for
12 universities per year - we use a pooled model for the data envelopment
analysis assuming each year to be an independent observation.9
The inputs used are associated with the university budget and comprise
the non-personnel expenditures deflated by the Swiss consumer price index
as well as academic (professors, assistant professors, researcher assistants)
and non-academic personnel (technical and administrative staff), both mea-
sured in full-time-equivalents.10
To capture the universities’ teaching output we use information on the
number of undergraduate students enrolled in Bachelor and Master’s pro-
grammes as well as the Licentiate programmes which are the former Swiss
degree programmes and comparable to a Master’s programme. As all data
used are at the discipline level, possible compensation effects between the
disciplines are excluded. This allows us a better assessing and comparing of
the real efficiency estimated in our analyses.
The number of Doctoral students as well as the amount of both public
and private third-party funds serve as proxy variables for the reasearch out-
put. Third-party funds are a good measure of research performance because
they are awarded to people with a successful track record in research produc-
tion, and hence reflect a kind of ‘market’ value for research (see e.g. Johnes,
1997; Harman, 2000). As already mentioned, we use public and private re-
search funds for our analysis to get a better picture of the faculty’s overall
research efforts and to cope with the argument of political determination of
public research funding. Some scholars argue that public research funding
is, to a large extent, politically determined and an increase in research funds
could reflect political priorities rather than an increase in research output.
The descriptive statistics on mean, standard deviation, minimum and max-
imum values of the inputs and outputs variables are given in the Appendix.
9As each year is handled as an independent observation the effect of technical devel-
opment on efficiency (e.g. greater use of new technologies, increased computing power,
speedier access to library resources) can not be directly measured, but indirectly by a
change in the efficiency scores. This should be beared in mind when interpreting the
results.
10As with an increasingly number of inputs and outputs the factor combinations of
the production process rise exponentially, the number of DMUs shaping the production
frontier increase and the probability that most of the DMUs become efficient rises. Hence,
it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between efficient and non-efficient
universities. So, Cooper et al. (2006) propose that the underlying sample should be at
least three times larger than the total number of inputs and output variables. Dyson et al.
(2001) recommend that the number of observations must be at least twice the product of
the number of inputs and outputs.
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Table 1: Description of variables used for efficiency and regression analyses
variables descriptions
input variables
NON-PERSEXP budg total amount of non-personnel expenditures publily financed by budget
in tausend CHF
SCPERS budg scientific personnel publicly financed by budget, measured in full-time
equivalents
NON-SCPERS budg non-scientific personnel publicly financed by budget, measured in full-
time equivalents
output variables
STUD UNG tot total number of stuents enrolled in undergraduate study programmes
(BA, MA, Licentiate)
PHD STUD tot total number of stuents enrolled in postgraduate study programmes
(Doctoral studies, PhD)
FUNDS tot total amount of third-party funds in tausend CHF (BA, MA, Licentiate)
explanatory variables
propSTUDFAC student-faculty ratio
propACADEM proportion of scientfic personnel per personnel in total
propPROF proportion of professors per scientific personnel
propBAMA proportion of number of students enrolled in Bachelor and Master’s
programmes per all undergradute students
STUDDURATION years of studying
MATQUOTE cant cantonal matriculation quota
FOUND year of university foundation
SIZE number of undergradutate and postgraduate students enrolled
GDP cant cantoal GDP per capita
MED dummy variable for universities operating a hospital
SPECIAL dummy variable for universities offering specifically study programmes
TIME trend time trend
As can be seen from Table 2 both the inputs and outputs cover a wide range
of data values which differ substantially across the disciplines.
Finally, the choice of output variables is based on other efficiency studies
in the area of higher education and on the availability of data. Generally, we
would prefer using graduates (Bachelor, Master, Licentiate) at the discipline
level as a proxy for the teaching output instead of students. Unfortunately,
there are no such discipline specific data available so far. Especially, ef-
ficiency studies for Anglo-Saxon countries use the number of students as
an output parameter. This is not crucial because the students are highly
selected and the drop out rate is negligible. However, Swiss universities
are assigned by law to enroll all people fulfilling the legal requirements to
study. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon system the quota on drop-outs is
significantly higher in Switzerland due to the missing selection procedures.
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Following Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003) and Carrington et al. (2004) we
use alternativly students as teaching output in order to capture the teaching
aspect of academia; i.g. teaching is already provided to undergraduate and
postgraduate students before they graduate and leave the university. To
capture the research output properly we would also have preferably used in-
formation on publications and citations11; but those data were not available
for the whole observation period.
In order to shed light on determinants probably driving university’s effi-
ciency we incorporate additional variables (the Z variables) in our analysis
which can be differentiated between university characteristics, and envi-
ronmental characterisics. Thereby, the explanatory variables used can be
divided into those which are under control of a university, e.g. the offered
range of study programmes as well as the staff and student body assum-
ing implemented selection procedures for both the personnel and students.
Determinants which are rather beyond the control of the university man-
agement are exogenous factors such as the location of a university or other
characteristics such as the regional infrastructure, the system of higher ed-
ucation financing or tertiary education reforms like the Bologna reforms.
For our analysis we do not include variables which capture specifics of
the student body because - as already mentioned - Swiss universities are
obliged to enroll all people fullfilling the legal requirements for studying.
However, if universities have the possibility for student selection, student
specifc determinants like sex, foreign origin and social background might
be of interest assuming that the student composition may have an effect
on efficiency. Instead, as almost 80% of the overall university budget is
spent on university personnel and rather to be under control of the univer-
sity managment we include variables to capture paricularly effects caused
by faculty composition. The proportion of scientfic personnel per overall
personnel (propACADEM) is used in order to capture an effect of scientific
versus non-scientific personnel assuming that universities with an overhead
of non-scientific personnel are probably less efficient because there is less
time left for teaching and research. The proportion of professors per scien-
tific personnel (propPROF) is also incorporated as proxy variable. One may
argue that the higher teaching and research knowledge of a professor com-
pared to a research assistant may have a positive impact on the efficiency.
Further, we use the student-faculty ratio (propSTUDFAC) measured as the
ratio of students enrolled in undergraduate and Doctoral programmes per
11For more details on using publications and citations as output variables see Carrington
et al. (2004).
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professors publicly financed by university budget because it is often used as
an indicator for teaching quality.
Furthermore, we use reform related variables such as the proportion of
the number of students enrolled in Bachelor and Master’s programmes per
all undergradute students (propBAMA) as proxy for the implementation
process of new study programmes, and the years of studying (STUDDU-
RATION) in order to control whether a fast implementation of Bachelor
and Master’s programmes and a reduced study time, respectively, affect
efficiency positively. The cantonal matriculation rate is further included
(MATQUOTE).
Additionally, we would like to include exogenous factors which are rather
beyond the control of university management, but in fact may give reason-
able explanations for efficiency variations. So, we use the year of university
foundation (FOUND) to capture the reputation of a university assuming
that the older a university is the more it has build up a stock of reputation in
teaching and research which may have a positive impact on efficiency. Due to
the fact that economies of scale may influence the efficiency the total number
of undergraduate and postgraduate students enrolled (SIZE) is included as
proxy variable. Moreover, the cantonal GDP per capita (GDP cant) is used
as an approximation to capture the impact of possible economic spillovers
indicated by a higher GDP. Thereby, the underlying assumptionis is that re-
search intense activities outside the university, such as the existence of labs,
research institutions or other think tanks, may affect university efficiency.
Finally, two dummy variables are included: We control for the existence
of a hospital (MED) assuming that a university which operates a hospi-
tal migth have higher costs which may affect the efficiency negatively. As
universities which are specialized with respect to their study programmes -
such as ETH Zurich and EPF Lausanne that offer study programmes in the
area of technical sciences while the University of St. Gallen and the Uni-
versity of Lucerne only offer study programmes in the area of humanities
and social sciences -, one can argue that the more a university is specialized
the better it has the ability to concentrate on their strenghts and hence
provide teaching and research probably more efficient. Therefore, we use a
corresponding dummy variable (SPECIAL). Finally, we incorporate a time
variable (TIME trend) which captures the shift in the technology represent-
ing change in technical efficiency.
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5 Results
Table 3 shows the results of the technical efficiency values analysed for the
Swiss universities throughout the period of 1999 to 2008. For each university
the efficiency of the overall production (column 2) and the efficiency of
four disciplines, that is humanities and social sciences, natural sciences,
medicine, and technical sciences (columns 3-6) are displayed. Generally,
efficient production is indicated by values of one, whereas values between
zero and one indicate inefficiencies in the production process. Since we
apply a bootstrap procedure to correct for biases due to sample size the
efficiency values obtained are slightly less than one. Both the bias corrected
estimated efficiency values as well as the original estimated efficiency values
(in parantheses) are given in Table 3. For instance a value of 0.85 means
that the same output could be produced with less than 15% inputs. In other
words, a university could become more efficient by 15%.
In alignment with findings in prior studies (see e.g. Schenker-Wicki and
Olivares, 2009; Schenker-Wicki and Hu¨rlimann, 2006) our results show rel-
atively high efficiency values for most of the universities in Switzerland.
These results indicate, that Swiss universities have mastered the reforms
quite well; i.g. it seems that efficient production of higher education was
not affected negatively by the additional burden of implementing the na-
tional and international reforms. For instance, the overall efficiency values
obtained on average are high and nearly stable for the observation period for
the University of Zurich as well as the Universities of Lausanne, St. Gallen,
Fribourg, Lucerne, Basle and Geneva.
However, analyzing in more detail and looking at the discipline level the
picture changes.12 This is already indicated by the means of the efficiency
values obtained for the disciplines: As the mean value at the university
level is 0.829 the mean values for the disciplines used for our analysis range
between humanities ans social sciences (0.791), natural sciences (0.887),
medicine (0.866) and technical sciences (0.952). However, except for the
Universita` della Svizzera Italiana the efficiency estimated at the university
as well as at the discipline level has increased, or at least has remained
unchanged over time.
In particular, our results show a clear compensation effect if efficiency is
assessed at the university level; it seems that a divergence of efficiency values
12Due to the fact that the number of observations is different across the disciplines a
direct comparison of the efficiency values is not possible. This should be considered when
interpreting the results. However, it gives a first clue that the estimation of efficiency at
the university level yield to biased efficiency values.
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occures through structural differences in the inputs and outputs. Lower effi-
ciency values in various disciplines can be compensated by higher efficiency
values in other disciplines. For instance, even though the universities in Fri-
bourg and Lausanne are overall highly efficient and build the benchmark for
efficient production at the university level we found lower efficiency values in
different areas such as humanities and social sciences. If looking only at the
total production level this compensation would be disguised. Particularly,
the results for humanities and social sciences show further that the efficiency
values are generally lower than in other disciplines. An explanation could be
that especially in study programmes of this discipline a teaching capacity is
held up in order to deal with the very high number of entry students though
the number of students decrease for higher semesters. Another point that
should be mentioned if analyzing only the overall production, is the fact
that the range of study programms and subjects the universities offer dif-
fer broadly. In Switzerland, only the universities of Berne, Basle, Zurich,
Geneva and Lausanne are so-called full universities offering a wide range of
subjects, whereas other universities offer only a small range of disciplines,
e.g. the university of St. Gallen and the university of Lucerne focuse on
humanities and social sciences, while the ETH Zurich and EPF Lausanne
focus on natural and technical sciences.
Table 4 presents the results of the second-stage truncated regression
estimated for the university level (column 2) as well as for the four disciplines
(column 3-6) based on the bias corrected DEA efficiency scores obtained
from the first stage with the standard error in parantheses. The overall fit of
the model specifications is quite good as indicated by the Wald chi2 and the
pseudo R2. No significant results are found for technical sciences, probably
due to the relation of the fairly small number of observations compared to
the number of explanatory variables used for the regression.
The results show a mixed pattern exept the variables which capture the
student-faculty ratio and faculty composition. As can be seen from Table 4
the student-faculty ratio has a small but highly significant influence on the
efficiency at the university-level, and for humanities and social sciences, as
well as natural sciences. The result indicate that the higher the student-
facutly ratio the higher the efficiency. Indeed, as this indicator represents
teaching quality meaning that the relation of professors per students should
be small to assures good teaching, our result imply that teaching quality
goes account of efficiency. However, this finding is quite intuitive as an in-
crease of labour inputs, that is the number of professors, comes along with a
low student-faculty ratio. Furthermore, the proportion of professors per sci-
entific personnel has also a significant positiv effect on the efficiency at the
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university-level, and for humanities and social sciences, as well as medical
sciences which may be due to higher knowledge and skills in teaching and re-
search. Especially, for medical sciences this might be plausible as professors
in this area has to be state-of-the-art with respect to newest research and
treatment techniques. For natural sciences we also find a positive significant
influence of faculty composition, too; that is the more scientific personnel the
higher the efficiency which imply that in this area a high overhead account
of teaching and research activities and hence decrease efficiency.
Moreover, we find unambiguous or no effects with respect to the stage of
implementing new Bachelor and Master’s programmes and the duration of
study. Only for humanities and social sciences there is a positiv significant
effect which means that the more study programmes already designed as
Bachelor and Master’s degrees the higher the university efficiency. This
is probably due to the fact that it is the largest area with respect to the
number of students enrolled compared to the other disciplines, and hence
the faster the implementation process of the new study programmes the
better. Further, a reduced study time - as we assumed - has a postive
impact on the efficiency for humanities and social sciences as well as at the
university level. Besides, for natural sciences the effect is the opposite which
we cannot explain so far.
With respect to institutional specifics we find no reputation effect of
older universities on efficiency but a positive though small size effect which
could be explained with the existence of economies of scale. Additionally,
no effects can be found when controlling for the existence of a hospital and
a specialized offering of subjects at the university level. Moreover, there are
unambiguous results for natural and medical sciences concerning the can-
tonal GDP which we could not explain so far. Finally, a negativ significant
time trend is identified for humanities and social sciences. Independent of
the negative sign that implies regressive technical change, the fairly low mag-
nitude suggests almost no technical change for the universities in our sample.
This result can be explained by the very limited possibilities of the higher
education institutions to benefit from labor or capital-saving technological
improvements which can be find in other sectors.
Summing up, we find that differences between disciplinary groups are
to some extent larger than differences between universities. Due to the
markedly efficiency variation across the disciplines, efficiency has to be ana-
lyzed on a disaggregated level and not at the university level. Otherwise the
efficiency values are biased, and therefore inappropriate for evidence-based
decision making. Moreover, our regression analyses show that there are de-
terminants that have an impact on the efficiency of Swiss universities. How-
14
ever, further analyses will be carried out to consolidate the findings. This
will be done in order to get some more evidence on the steering instruments
which could be used to make higher education production more efficient by
both the university management and the governmental authorities.
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Appendix
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of input and output variables
discipline (obs)
variable mean sd min max
uni-total (120)
non-persexp budg 103159.8 93491.91 1384.281 386098.8
scpers budg 1118.743 893.8452 33.25 3353.13
nonscp budg 713.4254 610.0981 14.3 2170.28
stud undg tot 7190.35 4811.746 164 20330
phd stud tot 1332.492 937.1336 29 3793
funds tot 81143.68 53903.8 494.131 199840.7
humanities and social sciences (107)
non-persexp budg 9166.377 10838.21 362.4849 44122.63
scpers budg 433.0408 312.245 33.2503 1280.9
nonscp budg 88.5986 83.91224 0.25 476.3
stud undg tot 5418.589 4129.776 164 16185
phd stud tot 627.6168 496.411 1 2063
funds tot 18438.64 14316.25 494.131 74112.34
natural sciences (95)
non-persexp budg 19710 17874.01 33.45228 67502.16
scpers budg 408.7037 355.953 3.75 1512.7
nonscp budg 198.1358 137.8536 1.5 594.05
stud undg tot 1287.779 945.8244 47 3836
phd stud tot 503.3368 339.5701 8 1586
funds tot 30369.18 17588.14 14.81374 80180.7
technical sciences (38)
non-persexp budg 16147.42 15722.9 359.1644 45551.07
scpers budg 559.3764 608.0413 21.18 1599.79
nonscp budg 191.7779 193.2858 6.5 525.31
stud undg tot 1948.231 1981.514 8 5130
phd stud tot 483.8462 493.9047 5 1471
funds tot 35290.33 29346.98 148.8284 81498.22
medicine (63)
non-persexp budg 56382.02 55338.51 1975.743 169642.8
scpers budg 387.6703 246.6299 45.56 969.8099
nonscp budg 325.6625 263.0664 16.3 922.91
stud undg tot 1235 533.5021 295 2203
phd stud tot 432.8833 245.1983 74 923
funds tot 43738.13 25811.57 2055.147 85944.03
(*monetary values are deflated and displayed in tausend Swiss Francs)
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Table 3: Efficiency values of Swiss universities 1999-2008
humanities and
uni year uni-total social sciences natural sciences medicine technical sciences
bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff
(original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff)
BS 99 0.781 0.771 0.727 0.958
(0.820) (0.794) (0.747) (1.000)
BS 00 0.696 0.737 0.747 0.959
(0.727) (0.772) (0.770) (1.000)
BS 01 0.693 0.692 0.730 0.871
(0.722) (0.718) (0.747) (0.883)
BS 02 0.871 0.819 0.926 0.948
(0.903) (0.851) (0.947) (0.969)
BS 03 0.942 0.872 0.966 0.949
(1.000) (0.906) (0.993) (1.000)
BS 04 0.949 0.822 0.966 0.960
(0.986) (0.861) (1.000) (0.978)
BS 05 0.938 0.816 0.950 0.976
(1.000) (0.853) (1.000) (1.000)
BS 06 0.918 0.852 0.946 0.938
(1.000) (0.890) (1.000) (1.000)
BS 07 0.941 0.861 0.926 0.965
(1.000) (0.906) (0.955) (1.000)
BS 08 0.924 0.892 0.945 0.944
(1.000) (0.943) (1.000) (1.000)
BE 99 0.756 0.684 0.958 0.674
(0.783) (0.710) (1.000) (0.681)
BE 00 0.663 0.674 0.924 0.640
(0.684) (0.697) (0.944) (0.649)
BE 01 0.664 0.700 0.895 0.677
(0.688) (0.724) (0.918) (0.684)
BE 02 0.707 0.802 0.910 0.672
(0.736) (0.822) (0.940) (0.681)
BE 03 0.842 0.933 0.933 0.796
(0.867) (0.966) (1.000) (0.802)
BE 04 0.804 0.886 0.940 0.759
(0.839) (1.000) (1.000) (0.767)
BE05 0.707 0.821 0.868 0.702
(0.738) (0.852) (0.894) (0.711)
BE 06 0.822 0.904 0.946 0.850
(0.849) (0.946) (0.975) (0.860)
BE 07 0.829 0.869 0.935 0.939
(0.864) (0.916) (0.960) (0.956)
BE 08 0.821 0.802 0.935 0.949
(0.864) (0.861) (1.000) (1.000)
FR 99 0.958 0.769 0.635
(0.996) (0.806) (0.651)
FR 00 0.953 0.803 0.619
(1.000) (0.830) (0.635)
FR 01 0.943 0.875 0.761
(0.980) (0.901) (0.776)
FR 02 0.921 0.885 0.764
(1.000) (0.914) (0.782)
FR 03 0.932 0.826 0.830
(1.000) (0.858) (0.850)
FR 04 0.934 0.871 0.842
(1.000) (0.899) (0.861)
FR 05 0.958 0.855 0.920
(1.000) (0.882) (0.938)
FR 06 0.966 0.819 0.937
(1.000) (0.847) (0.961)
FR 07 0.945 0.767 0.946
(0.993) (0.802) (0.970)
FR 08 0.933 0.745 0.938
(1.000) (0.786) (1.000)
GE 99 0.802 0.645 0.623 0.974 0.872
(0.833) (0.663) (0.637) (1.000) (0.887)
GE 00 0.820 0.727 0.602 0.949 0.857
(0.858) (0.770) (0.618) (1.000) (0.872)
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humanities and
uni year uni-total social sciences natural sciences medicine technical sciences
bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff
(original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff)
GE 01 0.883 0.768 0.571 0.937 0.979
(0.932) (0.815) (0.588) (1.000) (1.000)
GE 02 0.931 0.825 0.678 0.968 0.967
(1.000) (0.885) (0.695) (1.000) (1.000)
GE 03 0.884 0.736 0.658 0.923 0.871
(0.929) (0.780) (0.676) (0.941) (0.891)
GE 04 0.829 0.747 0.778 0.834 0.975
(0.868) (0.786) (0.800) (0.848) (0.993)
GE 05 0.819 0.828 0.687 0.863 0.965
(0.859) (0.885) (0.704) (0.877) (1.000)
GE 06 0.899 0.904 0.894 0.935 0.949
(1.000) (0.994) (0.922) (0.953) (1.000)
GE 07 0.893 0.885 0.841 0.929 0.949
(1.000) (1.000) (0.871) (0.947) (1.000)
GE 08 0.879 0.763 0.919 0.937
(1.000) (0.816) (1.000) (1.000)
LS 99 0.946 0.732 0.908 0.950
(1.000) (0.769) (0.931) (1.000)
LS 00 0.942 0.739 0.954 0.957
(1.000) (0.769) (1.000) (1.000)
LS 01 0.934 0.719 0.962 0.939
(1.000) (0.749) (1.000) (1.000)
LS 02 0.926 0.610 0.943 0.974
(0.965) (0.643) (0.965) (1.000)
LS 03 0.926 0.608 0.943 0.974
(0.961) (0.636) (1.000) (0.990)
LS 04 0.918 0.650 0.968 0.952
(0.954) (0.698) (1.000) (1.000)
LS 05 0.906 0.701 0.974 0.942
(0.941) (0.746) (0.996) (0.964)
LS 06 0.898 0.789 0.884 0.975
(0.929) (0.842) (0.905) (1.000)
LS 07 0.915 0.923 0.920 0.971
(0.950) (1.000) (0.942) (0.996)
LS 08 0.947 0.920 0.937 0.934
(1.000) (0.986) (0.960) (1.000)
LU 99 0.887 0.779
(1.000) (0.852)
LU 00 0.889 0.862
(1.000) (1.000)
LU 01 0.771 0.689
(0.818) (0.745)
LU 02 0.869 0.848
(0.926) (0.914)
LU 03 0.946 0.951
(1.000) (1.000)
LU 04 0.944 0.944
(0.994) (0.994)
LU 05 0.901 0.935
(1.000) (1.000)
LU 06 0.913 0.935
(1.000) (1.000)
LU 07 0.876 0.856
(0.929) (0.900)
LU 08 0.937 0.776
(1.000) (0.812)
NE 99 0.685 0.516 0.802 0.768
(0.719) (0.544) (0.827) (0.790)
NE 00 0.794 0.479 0.971 0.950
(0.839) (0.503) (1.000) (1.000)
NE 01 0.647 0.618 0.969 0.949
(0.687) (0.641) (1.000) (1.000)
NE 02 0.771 0.677 0.923 0.949
(0.803) (0.702) (1.000) (1.000)
NE 03 0.883 0.702 0.928 0.967
(0.910) (0.739) (1.000) (1.000)
NE 04 0.727 0.717 0.862 0.835
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humanities and
uni year uni-total social sciences natural sciences medicine technical sciences
bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff
(original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff)
(0.755) (0.747) (0.890) (0.861)
NE 05 0.801 0.766 0.956 0.959
(0.828) (0.799) (1.000) (1.000)
NE 06 0.750 0.807 0.943 0.913
(0.783) (0.847) (1.000) (0.940)
NE 07 0.756 0.764 0.957 0.950
(0.787) (0.801) (0.987) (1.000)
NE 08 0.738 0.717 0.923 0.948
(0.768) (0.752) (0.954) (1.000)
SG 99 0.890 0.855
(1.000) (1.000)
SG 00 0.936 0.885
(1.000) (0.980)
SG 01 0.951 0.860
(1.000) (1.000)
SG 02 0.933 0.851
(1.000) (0.910)
SG 03 0.948 0.865
(1.000) (0.928)
SG 04 0.934 0.870
(1.000) (1.000)
SG 05 0.869 0.859
(0.919) (0.933)
SG 06 0.851 0.794
(0.905) (0.871)
SG 07 0.914 0.856
(1.000) (1.000)
SG 08 0.881 0.857
(1.000) (1.000)
UZH 99 0.929 0.948 0.858 0.937
(0.971) (1.000) (0.874) (1.000)
UZH 00 0.953 0.932 0.848 0.939
(1.000) (0.985) (0.865) (1.000)
UZH 01 0.920 0.928 0.875 0.939
(0.966) (1.000) (0.891) (1.000)
UZH 02 0.936 0.908 0.919 0.954
(1.000) (1.000) (0.935) (1.000)
UZH 03 0.904 0.874 0.944 0.937
(1.000) (1.000) (0.960) (1.000)
UZH 04 0.935 0.919 0.949 0.937
(1.000) (1.000) (0.967) (1.000)
UZH 05 0.949 0.920 0.955 0.968
(1.000) (1.000) (0.978) (0.991)
UZH 06 0.946 0.892 0.942 0.937
(1.000) (1.000) (0.963) (1.000)
UZH 07 0.935 0.894 0.958 0.964
(0.999) (1.000) (0.993) (0.983)
UZH 08 0.878 0.860 0.946 0.937
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
USI 99 0.913
(0.962)
USI 00 0.919 0.859
(1.000) (1.000)
USI 01 0.884 0.848
(0.928) (0.925)
USI 02 0.737 0.915
(0.765) (0.978)
USI 03 0.676 0.907
(0.700) (0.946)
USI 04 0.744 0.826 0.920
(0.770) (0.864) (1.000)
USI 05 0.624 0.689 0.924
(0.654) (0.719) (1.000)
USI 06 0.662 0.675 0.922
(0.684) (0.703) (1.000)
USI 07 0.657 0.639 0.937
(0.681) (0.672) (1.000)
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humanities and
uni year uni-total social sciences natural sciences medicine technical sciences
bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff bias corr eff
(original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff) (original eff)
USI 08 0.596 0.617 0.921
(0.630) (0.654) (1.000)
EPFL 99 0.605 0.941 0.958
(0.641) (0.964) (1.000)
EPFL 00 0.599 0.849 0.970
(0.625) (0.878) (1.000)
EPFL 01 0.580 0.945 0.892
(0.610) (1.000) (0.915)
EPFL 02 0.675 0.921 0.953
(0.715) (0.951) (1.000)
EPFL 03 0.744 0.954 0.953
(0.793) (1.000) (1.000)
EPFL 04 0.666 0.958 0.965
(0.703) (0.989) (1.000)
EPFL 05 0.619 0.866 0.963
(0.644) (0.887) (0.989)
EPFL 06 0.589 0.789 0.975
(0.614) (0.809) (1.000)
EPFL 07 0.657 0.792 0.966
(0.688) (0.822) (1.000)
EPFL 08 0.683 0.950 0.949
(0.720) (1.000) (1.000)
ETHZ 99 0.614 0.918 0.943 0.972
(0.641) (0.942) (1.000) (1.000)
ETHZ 00 0.560 0.902 0.967 0.906
(0.582) (0.925) (1.000) (0.923)
ETHZ 01 0.585 0.470 0.955 0.838 0.916
(0.607) (0.503) (1.000) (0.856) (0.930)
ETHZ 02 0.644 0.611 0.926 0.946 0.896
(0.671) (0.645) (1.000) (1.000) (0.911)
ETHZ 03 0.818 0.752 0.935 0.939 0.829
(0.857) (0.788) (1.000) (0.963) (0.847)
ETHZ 04 0.667 0.639 0.962 0.913 0.822
(0.706) (0.666) (0.998) (0.930) (0.839)
ETHZ 05 0.681 0.766 0.960 0.796 0.871
(0.725) (0.797) (1.000) (0.813) (0.893)
ETHZ 06 0.846 0.636 0.934 0.973 0.948
(0.888) (0.662) (0.971) (1.000) (0.973)
ETHZ 07 0.880 0.509 0.925 0.873 0.935
(0.947) (0.533) (1.000) (0.892) (0.960)
ETHZ 08 0.878 0.628 0.921 0.970 0.949
(1.000) (0.662) (1.000) (0.990) (1.000)
(*Farrell efficiency values are displayed; No efficiency values indicate that at least one of the output variables has values of zero
All estimations are made with FEAR: A package for frontier efficiency analysis with R (Wilson, 2005).)
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Table 4: Truncated, second-stage regression of the efficiency scores
humanities and
uni-total social sciences natural sciences medicine technical sciences
propSTUDFAC 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
propACADEM 0.33 0.00 0.04*** 0.00 -0.01
(0.21) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
propPROF 1.13*** 1.23*** -0.67 0.87** -0.84
(0.21) (0.20) (0.60) (0.33) (1.22)
propBAMA -0.02 0.20*** 0.07 -0.01 0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
STUDDURATION -0.10*** -0.02** 0.11*** -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
MATQUOTE cant -0.01* -0.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FOUND -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SIZE 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP cant 0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00** -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
MED -0.03
(0.08)
SPEC -0.06
(0.03)
time trend 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
constant 0.93*** 0.44** 0.35 -0.69 2.12*
(0.30) (0.13) (0.34) (0.46) (1.02)
sigma cons 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log likelihood 166.63 141.3 146.71 109.15 75.73
Wald chi2 158.54 148.91 54.34 58.74 14.03
(Pseudo-R2) 0.6570 0.6025 0.5185 0.6541 0.3637
No. of observations 120 107 95 63 38
(*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%; standard erros in parentheses)
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